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CONGRESS PRESCRIBES PREEMPTION OF STATE 
TORT-REFORM LAWS TO REMEDY HEALTHCARE 
“CRISIS”: AN IMPROPER PROGNOSIS? 
JASON C. SHEFFIELD1 
Abstract 
 Say what you want about the tort-reform debate, but it has staying power. 
Over the last half-century, legislators and commentators have extensively debated 
every aspect of tort reform and the litigation “crisis” arguably giving rise to it, 
without resolving much of anything.  Despite this ideological stalemate, tort-reform 
proponents have managed to push measures through every state legislature. With fifty 
tries come fifty results, and for the most part, fifty failures. But have all these efforts 
been in vain? As of yet, no. Although the healthcare system does not appear to be 
improving, the numerous tort-reform measures states have adopted provide valuable 
insight into the litigation crisis, even (perhaps especially) when those measures have 
no effect. But Congress is impatient, one of its many child-like qualities.  
In June 2017, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1215—The 
Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (PACA). If enacted, PACA would impose 
comprehensive tort reform on states and, in many cases, preempt similar state laws 
currently in effect. For many legislators, regardless of political affiliation, this 
understandably raises federalism concerns. To appease these concerns, PACA’s 
drafters included provisions that appear deferential to similar state laws. However, 
when considered in context with the rest of the bill, PACA would likely preempt many 
state tort-reform provisions. This Article focuses on two PACA sections—the affidavit-
of-merit section and the expert-witness-qualifications section. PACA adopts both 
sections from existing state statutes that have proven controversial and resulted in 
arguably absurd results. By analyzing state approaches in both areas, this Article 
concludes that these sections of PACA would preempt all similar state laws, setting a 
uniform federal standard. This uniformity, however, would come at a high price—an 
unprecedented encroachment on states’ rights in an area of traditional state 
regulation. Further, the inequitable and absurd results occurring in these states would 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Extreme remedies are very appropriate for extreme diseases” 
—Hippocrates 
 
The healthcare system is diseased. The symptoms are well known: increasing 
healthcare costs, dwindling numbers of doctors and specialists, less access to care, and 
a poorer quality of care. But as anyone who has ever used WebMD knows, a single 
set of symptoms can indicate anything from a common cold to the bubonic plague. It 
is important, then, to determine the healthcare system’s disease before prescribing a 
treatment plan. With the Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (PACA), Congress 
has proposed an extreme remedy to combat the healthcare system’s symptoms, but it 
has misdiagnosed the disease.    
The U.S. House of Representatives passed PACA in June 2017 with the express 
purpose of “improv[ing] patient access to health care services and provid[ing] 
improved medical care by reducing the excessive burden the liability system places 
on the health system.”2 Congress has identified the symptoms—decreased patient 
access to care due to exorbitant healthcare costs. But what is the remedy? According 
to the House, it is comprehensive federal tort reform. Implicit in this prescription, 
Congress diagnosed the disease—medical malpractice plaintiffs.  
PACA includes several state tort-reform measures popular with tort-reform 
proponents, including a noneconomic damages cap and a shortened statute of 
limitations.3 This Article, however, focuses on two interrelated sections incorporated 
into PACA via an amendment introduced on the day it was passed in the House—the 
affidavit of merit section and the expert witness qualifications section.  
An affidavit of merit4 is a tort-reform measure requiring medical-malpractice 
plaintiffs to file an affidavit (either before, contemporaneously with, or shortly after 
filing a complaint) signed by an expert or the plaintiff’s attorney attesting to the 
expert’s belief that the case is meritorious.5 Currently, twenty-seven states require a 
certificate of merit in medical-malpractice cases, but each state takes a different 
approach.6 Some states also increase the requirements an expert must possess before 
                                                           
2 Protecting Access to Care Act, H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. (2017). 
3 See Emily S. Madden, One Nation, Even in Tort Law: How States Can Preempt or 
Circumvent Federal Preemption of Noneconomic Damage Limitations, 18 WYO. L. REV. 53, 
64 (2018) (discussing PACA’s preemption provision in its noneconomic damage cap section). 
4 This Article uses the term “certificate of merit” when generally referring to the body of law 
that has developed in this area. However, states use different terms, including “affidavit or 
merit,” expert report, as well as other variations.  
5 Mitchell J. Nathanson, It’s the Economy (And Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining the 
Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 1077, 1111 (2014); Carrie Lynn Vine, Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Crisis: Alternatives to Damage Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413, 425–26 (2006). 
6 163 CONG. REC. H5280 (June 28, 2017) (statement of Rep. Hudson). In addition to the 
twenty-seven statutes in effect, at least four other states have enacted certificate of merit 
statutes that are no longer effective. See Discussion infra at Section II.C. regarding state 
statutes held unconstitutional in state courts. 
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qualifying to sign the affidavit, often requiring that the expert practice or specialize in 
the same medical field as the defendant.7 
PACA includes an express preemption clause in both the affidavit of merit and 
expert witness sections. Although these provisions are titled “State Flexibility,” 
neither preemption clause is flexible in its application to state law. By using vague 
language, these sections initially seem to defer to state law and appear to merely 
establish a legislative floor. However, when compared to similar state statutes, it 
becomes clear that the drafters intended to establish both a floor and a ceiling, 
preempting every state law currently in effect.  
This Article argues that because no state certificate of merit approach has proven 
superior to others, mandating a uniform federal standard is unsound policy. If and until 
a certain approach proves effective, Congress should not foreclose states from 
experimenting with different tort-reform measures. Further, PACA’s preemption 
provisions will confuse state courts interpreting PACA’s preemption scope, creating 
disparate holdings across jurisdictions. Finally, PACA’s expert witness qualifications 
section will cause absurd results that could otherwise be avoided. 
Section II details the development of tort-reform in the states, provides a survey of 
state certificate of merit and expert witness statutes, and discusses some recurring 
issues associated with these state statutes. Section III examines PACA’s affidavit of 
merit and expert witness qualifications sections. Section III also breaks down both 
PACA sections into several core elements used in the preemption analysis in Section 
IV. Section IV concludes that despite preemption language disguised to appear 
deferential to state law, PACA would preempt every state certificate of merit and 
expert witness qualifications statute currently in effect. Section IV also discusses the 
negative ramifications of this result. Section V is a brief conclusion.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Litigation “Crisis” and Tort Reform 
Terms like “litigation crisis,” “insurance crisis, and “medical malpractice crisis,” 
refer to the modern public perception that frivolous litigation is rampant in the United 
States and substantially burdens our society.8 Over the last four decades, several of 
these so-called crises have garnered heavy attention from the media and politicians, 
both at the state and national levels. Tort reform measures are legislative responses to 
these purported crises. This section briefly examines the origins of the tort-reform 
movement, its goals (both express and actual), and some empirical studies that call the 
movement’s efficacy into question.  
The first litigation crisis occurred in the mid-1970s, followed by subsequent crises 
in the 1980s and early 2000s.9 In response, state legislatures enacted tort-reform 
measures aimed at limiting personal injury claims and recovery of damages by 
                                                           
7 Vine, supra note 5, at 426.  
8 Michael D. Johnston, The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and Their Consequences, 
21 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 181 (2007). This Article uses the term “litigation crisis” to refer 
generally to the various crises as each is rooted in the basic premise that excessive litigation 
gave rise to it.  
9 Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to a Nonexistent Problem: Empirical 
Analysis of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 69–70 
(2015); Vine, supra note 5, at 420. 
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plaintiffs.10 By the mid-1980s, more than forty states had enacted tort-reform 
measures.11 And states with tort reform already in place were not hesitant to enact 
more. In 1986 alone, forty-one states enacted tort reform legislation.12 In 1988, the 
Republican party made tort reform part of its national platform, and it has remained 
there ever since.13 Today, every state has enacted or elected tort-reform measures.14 
Thus, tort-reform proponents have been extremely successful in getting tort reform 
enacted at the state level. But that does not mean tort reform itself has been successful. 
Proponents claim that tort reform is necessary to lower skyrocketing medical 
insurance premiums on doctors caused by an increased rate of personal injury 
lawsuits.15  High insurance premiums, they argue, cause a decrease in physician supply 
and a lower quality of care for patients.16 Tort reform is thus a means to an end, the 
end being lower medical insurance premiums and better healthcare.17 To accomplish 
this end, tort-reform measures aim to reduce the overall volume of litigation and the 
amount of damages awarded in the suits that are filed.18 In this respect, studies seem 
to indicate that tort reform has been wildly successful at accomplishing the means 
towards its end.  
Tort filings have decreased significantly in the last several decades, as have jury 
awards in cases in which the plaintiff prevails on the merits. For example, a study by 
Scott DeVito and Andrew Jurs found that states enacting noneconomic damage caps 
resulted in total tort filings decreasing by 18% and medical malpractice filings 
decreasing by 86%.19 Other studies show drops in damage awards of 30% or more.20 
Findings like these could lead one to conclude that tort reform proponents are right 
about both the problem and the solution. However, other data calls both of those 
conclusions into serious question. 
In addition to examining the results occurring when states enact a noneconomic 
damages cap, Devito and Jurs also looked at what happened in states that had no such 
cap during the same period. They found that in these states, total tort filing decreased 
by 26% in the 1990s and another 27% in the 2000s.21 Similarly, medical malpractice 
                                                           
10 Devito, supra note 9, at 69. 
11 Vairo, infra note 34, at 1744; George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern 
Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (1987). 
12 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New 
in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1901 (2008). 
13 Devito, supra note 9, at 69–70. 
14 Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1077. 
15 Devito, supra note 9, at 64.  
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 111.  
18 Id. at 69.  
19 Id. at 79.  
20 Id. at 72–73.  
21 Devito, supra note 9, at 79.  
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filings dropped 18% during the 1990s and 24% in the 2000s.22 Other studies show 
similar patterns between states that had adopted tort reform and those that had not.23 
These studies indicate that individuals with meritorious tort claims are less likely to 
sue than in previous decades, regardless of whether their state has enacted tort reform. 
An even more surprising finding by DeVito and Jurs is what happened when a 
states noneconomic damages cap was nullified by the state’s high court. They 
theorized that eliminating the caps would lead to tort filings rebounding to pre-cap 
levels.24 However, they found that the opposite occurred—tort filings further 
decreased in these states after the caps were eliminated.25 While this is initially 
surprising, it becomes less so when considered in context with the way in which 
proponents were able to enact such pervasive tort-reform measures in the first place.  
B. The Tort-Reform Movement: A Scorched Earth Campaign 
From a political perspective, tort reform is a partisan issue. Republicans and 
conservatives are for it, and democrats are against it. But tort reform was around long 
before the Republican party added it to its platform in 1988. As it turns out, looking 
at the origins of the tort-reform movement illuminates its underlying validity or lack 
thereof.  
The tort-reform movement may have actually started as early as the 1950s, but it 
began accelerating in the 1960s and 1970s.26 Among the most influential actors were 
organization such as the Chamber of Commerce, various organizations funded by 
large corporations and insurance companies, as well as conservative political 
organizations, and conservative individuals like the Koch brothers.27 Armed with a 
multi-billion dollar budget, they waged a tort reform war on multiple fronts.28 On one 
front, there was a push to fund the campaigns of “tort-reform-oriented judges—
especially at the state supreme court level—as well as reformist legislators.”29 On 
another front, they started a public relations campaign with a narrative focused on 
turning the public against plaintiffs and plaintiff’s attorneys.30 The tort reform 
movement, therefore, was not just about influencing formal legal changes, it “has 
always been about altering the cultural environment surrounding civil litigation.”31 
Just as important as their strategy was their message. Tort reform draws on shared 
cultural ideals to create basic themes aimed at persuading the public of certain 
                                                           
22 Id. at 79.  
23 Id. at 74–75.  
24 Id. at 80.  
25 Id. at 80.  
26 Vairo, infra note 34, at 1741–42. 
27 Id. at 1743. 
28 Id. at 1742–43. 
29 Id. at 1743. 
30 Id. at 1741. 
31 Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Impact it has had is Between People’s Ears: Tort 
Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453 (2000). 
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propositions.32 These themes are ideas that everyone agrees with when stated 
abstractly.33 Tort reform used these themes to convince the public of certain notions, 
such as an out of control civil litigation system.34 First, an abundance of frivolous 
plaintiffs who, with the assistance of greedy plaintiff’s lawyers, file a substantial 
number of unmeritorious lawsuits, commanding unreasonably high settlement 
payments, creating the most litigious legal enjoinment in the world.35 Second, when 
meritorious claims go to trial, juries are overly sympathetic to plaintiffs and award 
exorbitantly high noneconomic damages. To keep up with these expenses, insurance 
companies are forced to raise premiums on doctors, which the doctors pass onto to 
their patients through higher rates for their services.  
Through countless television, radio, and print advertising campaigns, tort 
reformers were able to shift public opinion toward a view that condemns civil 
litigation and its participants. Public opinion polls conducted in the mid-1980s and 
later show the effectiveness of their message.36 There was also a noticeable effect on 
juror’s attitudes toward plaintiffs. Thus, it is not surprising that tort filings, particularly 
medical malpractice filings, have experienced significant declines, even in the absence 
of tort reform measures. There has not, however, been a corresponding decrease in 
medical insurance premiums or healthcare costs generally.37 It appears, then, that tort 
reform’s main contentions have been disproven, and one might expect to see 
legislatures start rolling back tort reform measures or at least not enacting more tort 
reform. But tort reform proponents have found a new theme to support their agenda, 
one that tort reform itself created—defensive medicine. 
C. The Effect on Doctors: Defensive Medicine as a Justification for More Tort 
Reform 
Much like the general public, physicians and healthcare providers believe that the 
litigation crisis is real and that it increases their insurance premiums.38 The fear of 
malpractice lawsuits causes many doctors to practice what is known as “defensive 
medicine.”39 Defensive medicine occurs when doctors practice in a way aimed at 
avoiding malpractice suits rather than in a way calculated to serve the patient’s best 
interest.40 Examples of defensive medicine include ordering additional diagnostic tests 
after diagnosis, unnecessarily referring patients to other doctors, refusing to treat high-
risk patients or to perform high-risk procedures, prescribing additional medication the 
                                                           
32 Id. at 454–55. 
33 Id. at 455. 
34 Id.  
35 Georgene Vairo, The Role of Influence in the Arc of Tort “Reform”, 65 EMORY L. J. 1741, 
1741 (2016); Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 4–5 
(1986). 
36 Daniels, supra note 31, at 464–65. 
37 Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1078. 
38 Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medical Malpractice 
“Crisis”, 23 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 480-81 (2012). 
39 Id. at 486. 
40 Id. 
 
34 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 32:1] 
 
patient does not need, and recommending unnecessary invasive procedures.41 Some 
studies indicate that 83% to 93% of doctors practice some type of defensive 
medicine.42 However, as just discussed, Americans are substantially less likely to sue 
for injuries today, especially in the medical-malpractice context, than they were 
twenty to thirty years ago. So defensive medicine is likely a by-product of tort reform’s 
effect on doctors’ perception of their patients as being eager to sue in the event of an 
injury, which we now know is untrue.  
With the empirical evidence showing that tort reform proponent’s claims of 
American litigiousness and sympathetic juries are not real, defensive medicine 
provides tort reform proponents with a new justification for enacting more tort reform 
measures. During House debates on PACA, some representatives cited figures as high 
as $650 billion that PACA might save in defensive medicine costs.43 This strategy is 
not novel. In 2005, the Bush administration and congressional republicans cited 
defensive medicine as a primary justification for a similar federal tort reform bill, 
which, like PACA, was passed in the House before stalling in the Senate.44  
Somewhat ironically, defensive medicine may be more costly than medical 
malpractice. Medical malpractice costs an estimated $30 billion per year, or 1% of 
total healthcare spending.45 Conversely, defensive medicine costs estimates range 
from $100 billion to $300 billion, or 10% to 30% of annual healthcare spending.46 So, 
if there is a healthcare crisis occurring today, the effect tort reform’s public relations 
campaign had on doctors is far more likely to be the cause than medical malpractice 
suits. Proponents are thus now using a crisis of their own making to justify enacting 
more tort reform. But, since tort reform leads to defensive medicine, more tort reform 
will not suddenly make doctors fearless about being sued for malpractice, which is 
probably not a desirable outcome anyway. With all of this in mind, the true 
motivations behind tort reform have become muddied. While the motivations are 
outside the scope of this Article, it may prove useful when considering the drafter’s 
intent in the preemption section below.  
D. State Certificate of Merit Statutes 
Academics and legislators have coined numerous terms for statutes imposing 
increased pleading requirements on medical-malpractice plaintiffs: affidavits and 
certificates of merit, expert opinion pleading,47 special pleading,48 heightened 
                                                           
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 163 CONG. REC. H5273 (June 28, 2017) (statement of Rep. King). 
44 Alexee Deep Conroy, Lessons Learned From the “Laboratories of Democracy”: A Critique 
of Federal Medical Liability Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1162–63 (2006). 
45 Jill Fairchild, The Defensive Medicine Debate: Driven by Special Interests, 19 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 297, 301 (2010). 
46 Id.  
47 Parness, infra note 50, at 537 (referring to similar statutes as “Expert Opinion Pleading). 
48 Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the Medical 
Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special 
Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 971 (2005). 
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pleading,49 the list goes on.50 Whatever term is used, these statutes have one thing in 
common—no two are the same. Certificates of merit started gaining popularity in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s as another means of achieving this goal.51 
Certificates of merit attempt to reduce frivolous lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to 
file an affidavit, usually when the suit is commenced or at some time shortly thereafter, 
certifying that a medical expert has reviewed the case and has a good-faith belief that 
the case has merit.52 These statutes provide malpractice defendants with a shield 
against the monetary and reputational costs associated with frivolous lawsuits.53 
Twenty-seven states have a certificate of merit statute currently in effect, but the 
specific provisions vary greatly between states.54  
Certificates of merit exploded on the tort-reform scene in the late 1980s after 
Maryland enacted its version to somewhat astonishing results. Maryland enacted a 
certificate of merit statute in 1986.55 In 1987, medical-malpractice filings in Maryland 
dropped 36% from the prior year.56 The sudden and drastic results in Maryland 
prompted other state legislatures to adopt similar provisions.57 However, by the mid-
1990s, the immediate results Maryland experienced had waned and medical-
malpractice filings were back to pre-1987 levels.58 
Certificates of merit have the same general purpose other tort-reform measures 
have but are somewhat unique in how they accomplish that purpose. Instead of 
reducing the monetary costs after the litigation ends, certificates of merit seek to 
dispose of cases early in the litigation before doctors and insurers accumulate 
substantial defense costs. Typical statutes try to accomplish this in two primary ways. 
First, certificates of merit limit the volume of medical malpractice filings by 
                                                           
49 Dace A. Caldwell, Civil Procedure: Medical Malpractice Gets Eerie: The Eerie 
Implications of a Heightened Pleading Burden in Oklahoma, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 977, 977 
(2004). 
50 This Article uses “certificate of merit” when referencing the entire body of law as some 
states do not require sworn affidavits. However, this Article also uses the term “affidavit of 
merit” for statutes that require the expert’s statements be in an affidavit.  
51 Id. at 1111. Although this Article focuses on certificate of merit statutes in the medical-
malpractice arena, many states, and the United States Congress, have either enacted or 
proposed similar legislation for products liability claims, professional malpractice actions 
against professionals other than doctors, and sexual abuse claims. Jefferey A. Parness & Amy 
Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Certificates of Merit?, 1997 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 537, 539. 
52 Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1111. 
53 Id.; Vine, supra note 5, at 426. 
54 163 CONG. REC. H5280 (June 28, 2017) (statement of Rep. Hudson). In addition to the 
twenty-seven statutes in effect, at least four other states have enacted certificate of merit 
statutes that are no longer effective. See Discussion infra at Section II.C. regarding state 
statutes held unconstitutional in state courts.  
55 Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1111. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1122 (text accompanying footnote 282). 
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discouraging plaintiffs who cannot show that their claim is meritorious from bringing 
a suit in the first place.59 Second, requiring certificates of merit provide doctors a quick 
and inexpensive way to dispose cases filed by plaintiffs who are unable to adequately 
show their case is meritorious.60 These statutes, then, act to shield doctors and 
insurance companies against the costs associated with defending meritless malpractice 
claims.61  
This second goal is likely the more important one. Many medical malpractice suits 
end favorably for the defendant, whether due to lack of merit or otherwise.62 However, 
while the case remains open, the defendant-doctors and their insurers incur substantial 
legal fees. One study showed that “nearly half of one major medical malpractice 
insurer’s legal costs went to defense of cases that were ultimately resolved without 
payment to the plaintiff.”63 This indicates that ultimately unsuccessful malpractice 
suits, which do not result in the plaintiff recovering, contribute almost as much cost to 
the healthcare system as those that plaintiffs win. Thus, proponents argue that 
requiring plaintiffs to show merit at an early stage should reduce the costs of defending 
these lengthy cases that will not result in compensation.64 Further, the plaintiff, who 
will not receive compensation whether the case is dismissed sooner or later, is 
ultimately no worse off.  
Certificate of merit statutes have proven popular among state legislatures since the 
early 1990s, with no indications that their popularity will decline. Iowa enacted a 
certificate of merit statute in its 2017 legislative session, becoming the most recent 
state to do so.65 But these statutes have encountered issues, especially in state courts. 
State high courts in Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Washington have all 
held their state’s certificate of merit statute unconstitutional.66 State legislatures, on 
the other hand, remain fond of certificates of merit. A state legislature will commonly 
respond to its supreme court’s decision by re-enacting the statute with curtailed 
provisions satisfying the court’s prior objections. Oklahoma provides an illustrative 
example of this practice. 
                                                           
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Vine, supra note 5, at 426. 
62 Id. (“Approximately 62 percent of all medical malpractice cases filed are resolved in favor 
of the defense, with the case being either dismissed or dropped without payment to the 
plaintiff.”); Williams, supra note 38, at 482 (stating that, from the late 1980s to early 1990s, 
70% of medical malpractice cases resolved without payment). 
63 Vine, supra note 5, at 426. 
64 Id. 
65 IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.140 (West 2017). 
66 See Crystal Axelrod, Certificate of Merit Requirement Violates Right of Access to Courts, 
35 AM. J.L. & MED. 692 (2009) (citing Putnam v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., PS, 216 P.3d 
374 (Wash. 2009); Wimley v. Reid, 2007-CA-00593-SCT (Miss. 2008); Summerville v. 
Thrower, 235 S.W.3d 415 (Ark. 2007); Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 
1994)); Jablow, infra note 68, at 16. 
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Oklahoma enacted its first certificate of merit statute in 2003.67 In 2006, the 
statute’s validity was challenged.68 In an 8 to 1 decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
held that requiring affidavits of merit in medical malpractice cases violated the 
Oklahoma constitution’s “special law” provision and the right of access to the state’s 
court system.69 Undeterred, the Oklahoma legislature amended the certificate of merit 
statute in 2009.70 In 2013, the updated statute was again before the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, and it was again held unconstitutional—under the exact same provisions as 
before.71 Later that same year, the legislature enacted yet another iteration of the same 
statute.72 In November 2017, relying on the same constitutional provisions it did in 
2006 and 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme Court once again struck down the statute.73 
E. Survey of State Certificate of Merit Statutes 
Although generally enacted for similar purposes, state certificate of merit 
provisions vary greatly between states.74 But state certificate of merit provisions can 
be divided into two broad categories: (1) the substantive requirements and (2) the 
timing requirements.75 
1. Substantive Elements of Certificates of Merit 
To a greater degree than the timing requirements, states have developed unique 
approaches to the substantive provisions in their certificates of merit. However, a 
thorough review of state statutes has gleaned several typical “elements” that most state 
statutes contain a variation of. These are not an exclusive listing of all possible 
elements but instead a representation of the most common provisions found in many 
                                                           
67 63 OKL.ST.ANN. § 1-1708.1E (Supp. 2003) (repealed by 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws, § 87, c. 
228). 
68 Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 2006 WL 3717904 (Okla. Dec. 19, 2006). 
69 Valerie Jablow, Oklahoma Justices Reject Affidavit of Merit Requirement in Med-Mal 
Cases, 43 MAR TRIAL 16, 18 (2007) (the Oklahoma Special Law provision prohibits special 
laws regulating “the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in, judicial 
proceedings or inquiry before the courts.”). 
70 Wall v. Marouk, 2013 OK 36, ¶ 9, 302 P.3d 775, 781; John v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2017 
OK 81, ¶ 12, 405 P.3d 681, 686. 
71 See Wall v. Marouk, 302 P.3d  at 777. 
72 John v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2017 OK 81 ¶ 15. 
73 Id. at ¶ 1. 
74 In addition to the elements discussed in this section, state statutes come in many different 
forms. For instance, state statutes vary in scope—that is, what claims the statute applies to. In 
New Jersey, the certificate of merit statute applies to “any action for damages for personal 
injury, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or 
negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation. . . .” N.J STAT. ANN § 
2A:53A-27 (West 2017). Conversely, the Texas affidavit-of-merit statute only applies if a 
plaintiff asserts “a health care liability claim.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a) 
(West 2017). States also differ regarding where the statute is codified. See Parness, supra note 
51, at 418-19. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2017). 
75 See Parness, supra note 51, at 419. 
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state statutes. Further, two states often take the same approach to one element and a 
very different approach to some, or even all, of the other elements. 
a. Role of the Expert Witness 
States have taken two primary approaches regarding the expert witness’s role in 
the certificate of merit process, with a few states taking hybrid approaches that 
incorporate aspects of both. On one hand, some states require that the plaintiff’s 
attorney certify that she consulted a medical expert before filing the suit and that the 
expert expressed a belief that the plaintiff’s case is meritorious.76 For example, New 
York’s certificate of merit statute requires that the plaintiff’s attorney provide a 
certificate declaring that she “has consulted with at least one physician . . . who the 
attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable in the relevant issues involved in the 
particular action, and that the attorney has concluded . . . that there is a reasonable 
basis for the commencement of such action.”77 In addition to New York, states 
following this approach include: Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, and Vermont.78 
On the other hand, most states require that a medical professional personally make 
statements in the affidavit or certificate, rather than the plaintiff’s attorney merely 
certifying that a consultation occurred.79 For instance, in New Jersey, “the plaintiff 
shall . . . provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person 
that there exists a reasonable probability that the care . . . exercised or exhibited in the 
treatment . . . that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional 
or occupational standards or treatment practices.”80 Along with New Jersey, fifteen 
other states also follow this approach: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, 
Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.81 
Some states take a hybrid approach in that, although the plaintiff’s attorney must 
attest that a consultation occurred, the expert must also make a written report 
expressing their belief that the case is meritorious, which the attorney must attach to 
the affidavit. For example, Florida’s statute provides that 
                                                           
76 See Benjamin Grossberg, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie Implications 
of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 222 (2010). 
77 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a(a)(1) (McKinney 2018). 
78 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-12.5 (West 2017); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (West 2017); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(1)-(2) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1042 (West 2017). 
79 Grossberg, supra note 76, at 222. 
80 N.J STAT. ANN § 2A:53A-27 (West 2018). 
81 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209 (2017); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (West 2017); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 147.140 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (West 2017); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912d (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.071 (West 2017); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-46 (West 2017); OHIO CIV. R. 10(D)(2) (West 2018); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 15-36-100 (2018); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2017); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.150 (West 2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (West 2017); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1519 (West 2017). 
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No action shall be filed for . . . medical negligence, . . . unless the attorney filing 
the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to 
determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence 
in the care or treatment of the claimant. The complaint . . . shall contain a certificate 
of counsel that such reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief . . . for an 
action against each named defendant. For purposes of this section, good faith may be 
shown to exist if . . . counsel has received a written opinion . . . of an expert . . . that 
there appears to be evidence of medical negligence.82 
Notably, this section further directs that if the court determines the attorney did not 
file the certificate in good faith, the court “shall” award attorney’s fees and report the 
attorney to the Florida Bar for a disciplinary review.83 Thus, while the statute does not 
mandate a written expert report, it is the only method the statute mentions by which a 
litigant can show the required good-faith belief in the action’s merits. And failure to 
exhibit this good faith carries heavy penalties for the attorney. Other states following 
this approach include Connecticut, Illinois, and Missouri.84 
Still other states take slightly different approaches than those already discussed. 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee require that the plaintiff’s attorney sign the 
affidavit, and the affidavit must certify that the attorney consulted an expert who 
provided a written report stating a belief that the case is meritorious.85 However, these 
states do not require the expert’s report be attached to the affidavit.86 Finally, Utah 
requires that both the attorney and the expert sign separate affidavits.87 
b. Required Contents of the Certificate of Merit 
Once again, states differ substantially regarding what information the certificate 
must contain, regardless of whether the expert or the attorney fills out the certificate. 
Some states are more lenient and only require that the expert express a general belief 
that a reasonable basis exists indicating the case is meritorious.88 This approach can 
apply whether the expert or the plaintiff’s attorney is the one making out the 
certificate; however, states requiring only that the attorney certify she consulted an 
expert are more likely to follow this approach. For example, in Illinois, the affidavit 
must contain a statement by the plaintiff’s attorney that the consulted expert 
determined “that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing” the lawsuit 
                                                           
82 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West 2017). 
83 Id. 
84 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (West 2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 
2018); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 538.225 (West 2017). 
85 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19.1 (West 2017) (held unconstitutional by John v. St. Francis 
Hosp., Inc., 2017 OK 81); PA. R. CIV. PROC. NO. 1042.3(a) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-
122 (West 2018). 
86 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19.1 (West 2017); PA. R. CIV. PROC. NO. 1042.3(a) (2017); § 
29-26-122. 
87 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-423 (West 2017). 
88 Parness, supra note 51, at 571-72. 
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and that, based on the expert’s report and consultation, the plaintiff’s attorney believes 
there to be “a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing” the case.89  
States taking stricter approaches do so in one (or both) of two ways. First, some 
states require the plaintiff’s expert state specific actions the defendant took that 
constituted malpractice.90 In Georgia, for instance, a plaintiff’s certificate of merit 
must contain an affidavit signed by an expert setting “forth specifically at least one 
negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.”91 
Second, some states will require specific statements by the affiant that relate to the 
elements of the plaintiff’s claim. In this respect, states take various approaches 
regarding what elements to which the expert must attest. Some states require that the 
expert state the appropriate standard of care and the way in which the defendant 
breached that standard (i.e., duty and breach).92 Some states, however, go farther and 
require the expert make statements regarding duty, breach, and causation.93 This is the 
strictest approach states take in this regard. states following these approaches include 
Arizona, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and West 
Virginia.94 
c. Scrutiny of Attesting Expert’s Qualifications. 
Regardless of who must make out the certificate, each state requires that the 
plaintiff’s attorney have some degree of confidence that the expert relied upon is 
qualified to testify. States are all over the spectrum in this regard. At the low end, some 
states merely require that the plaintiff’s attorney have a “reasonable” or “good faith” 
belief that the expert is qualified to give an opinion in the case.95 At the high end of 
the spectrum, some states apply the same standard as an expert who testifies at trial.96 
Thus, if the plaintiff’s expert would not qualify as an expert at trial, the expert is also 
incompetent to fill out the pre-trial certificate of merit. Further, as will be discussed in 
greater depth later, many states impose heightened expert witness qualifications in 
medical malpractice cases, making this approach a heavy burden at an early stage of 
the litigation.97  
                                                           
89 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(a)1 (West 2018). 
90 Parness, supra note 51, at 562. 
91 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (West 2018). 
92 See, e.g., N.J STAT. ANN § 2A:53A-27 (West 2018); and, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) 
(2018). 
93 Jeanne M. Scherlinck, Medical Malpractice, Tort Reform, and The Separation of Powers 
Doctrine in Michigan, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 313, 337 (Winter 1998). 
94 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (West 2017); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912d 
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95 OHIO CIV. R. 10(D)(2) (West 2018). 
96 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1042 (West 2017). 
97 See Discussion infra, at III.D. 
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2. Time of Filing 
As to when the plaintiff’s certificate of merit must be filed, states have taken three 
general approaches. Most states require contemporaneous filing of the certificate with 
the complaint.98 Some states require that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit as a 
prerequisite to initiating a medical-malpractice lawsuit.99 Still other states require 
plaintiffs to file their certificate of merit after the lawsuit is initiated, but usually before 
any meaningful discovery has occurred.100 This future filing date is usually tied to 
some other procedural step; for instance, within sixty days of the defendant filing its 
answer.101  
a. Certificate of Merit as a Prerequisite to Filing a Claim 
One state, West Virginia, requires that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit thirty 
days before commencing a medical malpractice action.102 Although pre-suit 
certificates of merit are rare, many states impose a notice of suit requirement, whereby 
plaintiffs must serve the defendant with a written notice stating the plaintiff’s intention 
to bring a malpractice action, but without requiring the plaintiff to consult an expert.103  
b. Certificate of Merit Filed Contemporaneously with the Pleadings 
The most popular approach is the contemporaneous filing requirement. Currently, 
eighteen states follow this approach: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington.104 
However, while these states take the same approach regarding timing, they do not 
agree on much else, and many variations exist between them. For example, in North 
Carolina, a medical malpractice plaintiff’s pleading must “specifically assert[] that the 
medical care and all medical records pertaining to the alleged negligence that are 
available to the plaintiff after reasonable inquiry have been reviewed by. . .” either “a 
person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness. . .” or “a person 
                                                           
98 Id. at 552. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Nuveen Mun. Trust v. Withumsmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing N.J STAT. ANN § 2A:53A-27). 
102 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (West 2017). 
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that the complainant will seek to have qualified as an expert . . . and who is willing to 
testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care.”105 
Conversely, most states require that the certificate be in the form of an affidavit or 
written report, rather than specifically alleged in the pleadings. This is likely because 
North Carolina’s approach may conflict with the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard 
when medical malpractice cases wind up in federal court.106 However, that issue is 
outside this Article’s scope. 
c. Certificate of Merit Filed at After the Initial Pleadings 
The third approach requires filing after the complaint is filed but usually well 
before trial. Eleven states currently follow this approach: Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, 
and Wyoming.107 
Within this category, there are two main elements: (1) how the beginning of the 
filing period is determined and (2) the period’s length. Regarding the first element, 
most statutes tie the start of the filing period to a specific procedural device, typically 
the filing of the complaint or the defendant’s answer. Six states use the complaint’s 
filing date to initiate the plaintiff’s certificate of merit filing period. Those states are 
Arkansas, Colorado, Maryland, Missouri, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania.108 
Three states—New Jersey, Texas, and Wyoming—start the certificate of merit 
filing period when the defendant files her answer.109 Here again, although these three 
state statutes share a general characteristic, each has its own nuances, which results in 
significant variability between them. For example, in Texas, a plaintiff has 120 days 
from the time the defendant files its original answer to serve the expert report on the 
defendant.110 But in New Jersey, a plaintiff alleging malpractice or negligence against 
                                                           
105 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(1)-(2). 
106 Grossberg, supra note 76, at 245. 
107 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2603; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
20-602; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 538.225; N.J STAT. 
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Thrower, 253 S.W.3d 415 (Ark. 2007) (holding § 16-114-209(b)(3)(A) unconstitutional); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602(1)(a); (“the plaintiff’s or complainant’s attorney shall file with 
the court a certificate of review . . . within sixty days after the service of the complaint”); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i) (requiring that plaintiffs “file a certificate of 
a qualified expert . . . within 90 days from the date of the complaint”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
538.225 (“Such affidavit shall be filed no later than ninety days after the filing of the 
petition”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-46 (“plaintiff serves upon the defendant an 
affidavit containing an admissible expert opinion . . . within three months of the 
commencement of the action”); PA. R. CIV. PROC. No. 1042.3(a) (“the attorney for the plaintiff 
. . . shall file with the complaint or within sixty days after the filing of the complaint, a 
certificate of merit”). 
109 N.J STAT. ANN § 2A:53A-27; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351; WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 9-2-1519. 
110 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a). 
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a licensed professional (not just healthcare professionals, but most professionals 
licensed by the state) “shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer 
to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an 
appropriate licensed person.”111 One state, Arizona, requires that the plaintiff’s 
affidavit of merit be included with the initial pretrial disclosures.112 
F. State Expert Witness Qualifications Statutes 
Another increasingly common tort-reform measure are statutes imposing 
heightened qualifications requirements on expert witnesses. These statutes limits 
experts who may testify to the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice 
case, usually by requiring that the expert and defendant share similar certifications and 
experience.113 These statutes commonly apply to trial testimony, but many states also 
apply the heightened standard to the plaintiff’s certificate-of-merit expert.114 
Medical malpractice litigation is often extremely complex; thus, as a practical 
matter, expert testimony is usually necessary to establish the proper standard of care 
and whether that standard was breached.115 Consequently, medical experts are the 
most commonly utilized category of experts.116 Many states have enacted heightened 
qualification standards applying exclusively to medical-malpractice experts.117 These 
statutes are based on the policy that, given the inherent complexity of medical 
malpractice cases, only experts with similar training and experience to the defendant 
are qualified to attest to the appropriate standard of care.118 This section discusses a 
few popular metrics states have developed to effectuate these policies. 
1. Heightened Expert Witness Qualifications Provisions 
a. Specialty Matching 
Many states impose what this Article refers to as “specialty matching”—requiring 
that expert witnesses share the same medical specialties as the defendant they intend 
to offer testimony against. Although some states go farther than others, the typical 
statute requires that, if the party against whom testimony is being offered is a specialist 
in a particular medical field, the witness must also specialize in the same or a similar 
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112 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2603(B). 
113 Vine, supra note 5, at 426. 
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field before the witness may testify regarding the standard of care in that field.119 
Further, some states also require that the witness match any subspecialties of the 
defendant.120 Some states additionally require that expert witnesses and defendants 
share the same board certifications.121 
The underlying policy of specialty matching is simple—in highly specialized 
medical fields, only other such specialists know the actual standard of care. At first 
blush, this policy sounds reasonable. However, due to courts strictly construing these 
statutes to effectuate the legislature’s intent, absurd results can occur.  For example, 
in Baker v. United Physicians Healthcare, seventeen-year-old Tara Baker died after 
the defendant, Dr. Brenda Wittman, treated her for blood clots.122 Tara’s father (Baker) 
sued Dr. Wittman, claiming that Tara’s death resulted from medical malpractice.123 
Dr. Wittman specialized in pediatrics with a subspecialty in pediatric hematology-
oncology.124 Baker retained Dr. Robert Brouillard as an expert witness.125 Dr. 
Brouillard specialized in internal medicine and had subspecialties in both hematology 
and oncology.126 The defense moved for summary judgement, claiming that Dr. 
Brouillard did not qualify as an expert under Arizona’s expert witness qualifications 
statute.127 Concluding that pediatric hematology was the relevant specialty, the court 
held that Dr. Brouillard was not qualified to testify as an expert in the case and granted 
the defendant’s motion.128   
After the appellate court affirmed, the Arizona Supreme Court granted review to 
address section 12-2604’s application.129 The court first determined that the statute 
requires an expert witness to specialize in the same specialty as the defendant “only 
when the care or treatment at issue was within that specialty.”130 The court defined 
“specialty” as “a limited area of medicine in which a physician is or may become 
board certified.”131 The court then determined the scope of “specialty” to include all 
recognized specialties and subspecialties.132 The court reasoned that excluding 
subspecialties from the definition of “specialty” (which the court of appeals did in this 
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case) too broadly construed section 12-2604 because it would allow, for example, a 
pediatrician unfamiliar with hematology to testify regarding a pediatric hematologist’s 
care of “a seventeen-year-old patient suffering from a serious blood disorder.”133  
Despite emphasizing Tara’s age as it related to a general pediatrician’s 
hypothetical testimony, the court dismissed its relevance in the actual case before it. 
Applying its newly developed test for section 12-2604, the court determined that 
because evidence showed that both a pediatric and non-pediatric hematologist could 
have treated a seventeen-year-old’s blood disorder, “Dr. Wittman was practicing 
within her specialty of pediatric hematology-oncology.”134 Thus, only an expert in that 
specialty could testify to the appropriate standard of care, even though other specialists 
could have provided competent treatment.135 
Specialty matching can sometimes lead to a plaintiff’s expert being disqualified as 
a witness because the expert is over qualified in relation to the defendant. In Decker 
v. Flood, the plaintiff sought treatment for a toothache from the defendant, who was a 
dentist.136 Dr. Flood determined that Decker needed a root canal and immediately 
performed the procedure.137 After returning home, Decker contacted Dr. Flood after 
experiencing severe pain.138 Decker returned to Dr. Flood’s office, at which point Dr. 
Flood administered so much Novocain that Decker stopped breathing and had to be 
rushed to a hospital.139 After Decker recovered, he consulted Dr. Michael Gallagher, 
an endodontist, who completed the procedure Dr. Flood had botched.140 Decker 
brought a malpractice suit and, pursuant to Michigan law, attached an affidavit of 
merit from Dr. Gallagher to the complaint.141 Dr. Flood moved to dismiss, arguing that 
because he was only a general practitioner, and Dr. Gallagher specialized in root 
canals, Dr. Gallagher was not qualified to attest to the appropriate standard of care 
under Michigan’s expert witness qualifications statute.142 In response, the “plaintiffs 
argued that the statute ‘did not make sense,’ because it precluded Dr. Gallagher, whose 
practice was limited to root canals, from giving expert testimony concerning the 
standard of practice for root canals.”143 The trial court granted Dr. Flood’s motion, 
noting that Michigan’s statute clearly precludes experts from testifying against general 
practitioners regarding the standard of care for general practitioners.144 
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The Michigan expert qualifications statute directs that an expert cannot attest to 
the appropriate standard of care if the opposing party is a general practitioner unless 
the expert devoted most of her professional time during the year preceding the incident 
giving rise to the claim at issue to “active clinical practice as a general practitioner.”145 
On appeal, Decker argued that the trial court’s interpretation created an absurd result 
whereby an expert eminently qualified to testify concerning the standard of care for 
performing root canals is unqualified to testify about root canals.146 The Court of 
Appeals disagreed and affirmed, stating that “[they] found no absurdity or 
unreasonableness in the requirement that the qualifications of a purported expert 
match the qualifications of the defendant against whom that expert intends to 
testify.”147 
b. Recency of Expert’s Experience 
In addition to specialty matching, many statutes require that the expert to have 
been practicing in that specialty at the time of the events giving rise to the current 
litigation and been practicing in that specialty for a prescribed number of years 
beforehand. The requisite number of years preceding the plaintiff’s injury that the 
witness must have been practicing varies from one to six years depending on the 
state.148 These statutes typically apply conjunctively with the specialty matching 
requirements, further narrowing the number of qualified experts available. Some states 
further require, not only that the witness have been practicing for the specified number 
of years, but also that they have devoted a majority of their professional time to the 
defendant’s specialty during that period.149  
c. Expert Licensed in Same Region as Defendant—The Locality Rule 
Although most states no longer restrict where an expert is licensed, a few states 
require that the expert witness be licensed in the same geographic region as the 
defendant. States that do impose geographical licensure limitations on expert 
witnesses take one of two main approaches. First, some states require the expert be 
licensed in the same state as the defendant or a contiguous state. Second, other states 
require the expert practice within a certain distance to the defendant, measured in 
terms of square miles from the defendant’s practice or the location the allegedly 
negligent care occurred.  
Tennessee follows the former approach. Tennessee’s statute, which applies to trial 
testimony and certificates of merit, provides that “[n]o person in a health care 
profession … shall be competent to testify . . . to establish the facts required to be 
established by subsection (a), unless the person was licensed to practice in the state or 
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a contiguous bordering state. . . “150 These geographic restrictions have received 
increased criticism as technological advances create less disparity in the standard of 
care between regions.151  
III. THE PROTECTING ACCESS TO CARE ACT OF 2017 
On June 28, 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed PACA, a 
comprehensive tort-reform bill incorporating several controversial provisions.152 Most 
Democrats, as well as a few Republicans, staunchly opposed PACA. Many public 
interest groups also expressed concerns about PACA, including the Center for Justice 
and Democracy, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Union, National 
Association of Consumer Advocates, National Women’s Health Network, and Public 
Citizen.153 In addition, the American Bar Association also opposed PACA, stating that 
for “200 years, the authority to determine medical liability law has rested in the states” 
and that this “is a hallmark of the American justice system.”154 On the day it was 
passed, several amendments were introduced and incorporated into the bill—including 
an affidavit of merit requirement and heightened expert witness qualifications.155 
A. PACA’s Affidavit of Merit Section 
Section 14 of PACA details the affidavit of merit requirements. Under this section, 
the plaintiff must file, contemporaneously with the complaint, an affidavit signed by 
an expert meeting section 13’s expert witness requirements.156 The affidavit must 
certify that the expert reviewed the plaintiff’s relevant medical records and contain a 
statement of the following elements: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) the 
expert’s opinion that the defendant breached that standard; (3) and how the 
defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.157 Further, the expert 
must state the actions or omissions the defendant should have observed to comply with 
the standard of care and list the medical records the expert reviewed.158 
Several essential elements can be gleaned from this section that are relevant to the 
subsequent preemption analysis. PACA’s affidavit of merit section has eight core 
elements. Those core elements are: 
1. The expert (rather than the plaintiff’s attorney) must sign the affidavit; 
2. The expert must meet the heightened qualification requirements in section 13; 
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Telesurgical Malpractice, 6 Tex. A&M L. R. __ (forthcoming April 2019).  
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3. A statement certifying that the expert reviewed all relevant medical records; 
4. The expert must state the applicable standard of care; 
5. The expert must state an opinion that the defendant breached the standard of 
care; 
6. The expert must state what actions the defendant should have taken or omitted 
to comply with that standard; 
7. The expert must state how the breach of the standard proximately caused the 
plaintiff’s injury; and 
8. The expert must list all medical records reviewed.  
B. PACA’s Expert Witness Qualifications Section 
Section 13 contains the requirements to qualify as an expert witness. Under this 
section, a plaintiff’s expert must be licensed to practice medicine in any state.159 If the 
defendant is or claims to be a specialist, the plaintiff’s expert must specialize in the 
defendant’s specialty; and if the defendant is or claims to be board-certified, the expert 
must also be board certified in the defendant’s specialty.160 Further, the expert must 
have either actively practiced the defendant’s specialty or taught that specialty at an 
accredited medical school or residency program for a one-year period immediately 
preceding the alleged malpractice.161 If the defendant is a general practitioner, 
however, the expert must have spent the preceding year actively practicing as a general 
practitioner or teaching the same.162   
Thus, this section adopts most controversial elements that have developed in the 
states. The four core elements of this section are:  
1. The expert must be licensed to practice medicine. 
2. Specialty and board certification matching;  
3. The expert was actively practicing or teaching the defendant’s specialty for at 
least one year prior to the alleged malpractice; and  
4. Limits experts in a case against a general practitioner to other general 
practitioners. 
C. PACA’s “State Flexibility” Provisions 
Both the affidavit of merit and expert witness qualifications sections contain an 
express preemption provision titled “State Flexibility.”  Both of these provisions direct 
that nothing in the respective sections intends to preempt state laws imposing 
“additional” requirements on plaintiffs.163 This title is ironic because, as Congressman 
Steven Cohen points out, the “so-called state flexibility provisions . . . attempt to brush 
off federalism concerns that these provisions are mostly one-way preemptive. They 
only preserve state laws that mirror the amendments’ requirements and state laws 
which include requirements in addition to those imposed by the amendment.”164 
However, Representative Cohen’s statement might be overly generous as the express 
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language does not specifically preclude identical state statutes from preemption. 
Rather, as is developed below, even virtually identical state statutes will likely be 
preempted. As one Congresswoman put it, PACA “would preempt state law in all 50 
states with a rigid, uniform set of rules designed to make it more difficult for 
malpractice victims to obtain relief in the courts.”165 
D. Both Sections are Based on Existing State Statutes 
Although the legislative history is silent on the matter, PACA borrows both its 
affidavit of merit and expert witness qualifications sections from existing state 
statutes—the affidavit of merit from Michigan166 and the expert witness qualifications 
from Arizona.167 The sections are far too similar for it to be coincidental. As to the 
affidavit of merit sections, PACA adopts 95%168 of Michigan’s statutory language, 
with several of the discrepancies merely phrasing related.169 Most notably, PACA 
adopts every substantive provision in the Michigan statute except one. The only part 
of Michigan’s statute that PACA omits is the provision requiring the plaintiff’s 
attorney reasonably believe that the expert meets the requirements contained in the 
separate qualifications statute.170 PACA omit this language that would give the 
plaintiff’s attorney an opportunity to show that she reasonably believed the expert met 
those requirements, when the expert in fact did not. Further, PACA contains an 
additional requirement absent from Michigan’s statute. PACA’s fifth enumerated 
provision, requiring a statement of all the medical records the expert reviewed, is 
wholly the amendment drafter’s creation.171 
Regarding the expert witness sections, PACA also borrows 95%172 of Arizona’s 
statutory language.173 And in this case, the discrepancies are completely de minimis. 
However, while section 13 does not omit any of Arizona’s provisions, unlike section 
14, it does not add anything absent from the state statute. 
When a legislature adopts a statute from another jurisdiction, it is presumed to have 
also adopted the judicial interpretations of that statute by the jurisdiction’s highest 
court.174 Federal courts, then, may look to decisions by the Arizona and Michigan 
Supreme Courts for guidance on interpreting PACA’s adopted statutory language. 
Thus, PACA’s expert witness qualifications section likely implicitly adopts the 
decision in Baker, where the court held that, although the expert could have 
                                                           
165 163 CONG. REC. H5267 (daily ed. June 28, 2017) (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee). 
166 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912d.  
167 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2604. 
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600.2912d(1), and H.R. 1215, §14(a). 
170 Compare, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912d(1), with, H.R. 1215, § 14(a). 
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competently treated the patient, he could not testify because the defendant was acting 
within her unique specialty when she caused the patient’s death.175  
Although this rule is based on stare decisis principles, whereby things that have 
already been determined do not need to be constantly redetermined, it is not 
conclusive—it is likely “that if a precedent underlying an adopted statute were no 
longer vital or were poorly reasoned,” courts will not follow it.176 So, while those state 
supreme court decisions may be helpful, it is important to remember that federal courts 
will not be bound by them.177 However, these statutes are unambiguous, so even if 
potentially absurd results occur, courts are likely to enforce them regardless because 
the legislature is free to mandate absurd results.178  
 
IV. PACA WOULD PREEMPT ALL STATE CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AND 
EXPERT WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS STATUTES 
Due to the stringent requirements PACA places on medical-malpractice plaintiffs 
and its vague preemption language, PACA would preempt most, if not all, state 
certificate of merit and expert witness qualifications statutes. There are many possible 
effects of this; for certificates of merit, Congress would foreclose states from 
experimenting to determine the best approach for this relatively new tort-reform 
measure. Further, regarding expert witness qualifications statutes, Congress would 
create a rigid standard, robbing trial court judges of their typical gatekeeper role in 
determining expert qualifications, which would ultimately result in otherwise 
qualified experts being disqualified based on arbitrary specialty matching. Moreover, 
PACA’s enactment, which would cause these perverse results, directly conflicts with 
federalism principles and violates state sovereignty. 
A. Federal Supremacy and Preemption of State Law 
Federalism is a central component of the United States system of government; it 
“adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of 
sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”179 The existence of multiple sovereigns 
creates the possibility that the laws of one will conflict with the other.180 Foreseeing 
the inevitable state and federal clash, the Framers provided a solution—the Supremacy 
Clause.181 The Supremacy Clause bestows upon Congress the power to preempt state 
                                                           
175 Baker, 296 P.3d at 50; see Discussion supra at Section III.D.1.. 
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legislators' intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it 
with an unenacted legislative intent.” 
179 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012). 
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laws.182 However, when state and federal law are at odds, courts—not Congress—
decide whether Congress intended to preempt the state law.183 In making this 
determination, Congressional purpose “is the ultimate touchstone,”184 so courts start 
with the language of the federal statute.185  
There are two general preemption categories—express preemption and implied 
preemption. Express preemption is the most straightforward; it exists when Congress 
explicitly states an intention to limit the application of state law.186 However, Congress 
is not required to make this intention explicit; if a court finds that the state and federal 
laws cannot coexist, the court may deem that the federal law preempts the state law.187 
This scenario leads to the two implied preemption categories—conflict preemption 
and field preemption.  
Conflict preemption arises “when state and federal regulations conflict.”188 There 
are two situations in which conflict may occur: (1) when complying with both the 
federal and state law is impossible and (2) where the state law represents an obstacle 
to accomplishing the federal statute’s congressional purpose.189 Alternatively, field 
preemption exists when Congress determines that regulation of a particular field of 
activity is within its “exclusive governance” but failed to include any express language 
manifesting that intention.190 In such instances, courts have held that “the intent to 
displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so 
pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it’ or where there 
is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’”191 
PACA’s “State Flexibility” sections are express preemption clauses, so express 
preemption is implicated in this discussion. However, even when Congress explicitly 
states it intention to preempt some state law, situations can arise that necessitate courts 
relying on implied preemption principles to discern congressional intent.192 There is a 
dispute as to whether this is appropriate, but for the purposes of this Article, it is 
enough to know that this principle exists.193 
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B. PACA’s Preemption Scope 
The Supreme Court interprets expressly preemptive statutory language 
methodically. When a statute contains preemptive language, courts need not go 
beyond the statute’s text to determine that Congress intended to preempt state law, to 
at least some extent; however, courts must still identify the statute’s preemption 
scope.194 The preemption scope analysis begins with the text, but the court’s 
interpretation “does not occur in a contextual vacuum.”195 Rather, when discerning a 
statute’s preemption scope, the interpretation relies on two preemption 
presumptions.196 
The first such presumption finds its roots in federalism. Because states enjoy 
independent sovereignty in the federal system, courts presumes Congress has not 
“cavalierly pre-empt[ed] state-law causes of action.”197 Further, courts initially 
assume that federal law does not preempt state police powers unless that was 
Congress’ “clear and manifest purpose.”198 So, while congressional intent remains the 
focal point of preemption analysis, this presumption “puts a thumb on the interpretive 
scale” for federal laws in areas traditionally occupied by the states.199 
The second presumption guides the analysis of a statute’s preemption scope.200 
This presumption directs that, in all preemption cases, “the purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone.”201 This intent is primarily discerned from the statute’s language 
and surrounding statutory framework.202 However, the statute’s structure and purpose 
as a whole is also relevant; this is discerned not only from the text, but also from the 
court’s “reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute . . 
. to affect business, consumers, and the law.”203 Both presumptions apply with full 
force here.  
PACA’s affidavit of merit and expert witness qualifications sections share similar 
preemption language. The affidavit of merit section’s preemption clause provides that 
“[n]o provision of this section shall be construed to preempt any State law . . . that 
establishes additional requirements for the filing of an affidavit of merit or similar 
pre-litigation documentation.”204 Similarly, the expert witness qualifications section 
provides that nothing in that section “shall be construed to preempt and State law . . . 
that places additional qualification requirements upon any individual testifying as an 
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expert witness.”205 It is immediately apparent that these sections intend to set a 
minimum standard—a legislative floor. The preemption scope, then, is anything below 
the standard contained in PACA’s substantive subsections.  
Accordingly, the issue becomes determining how a state can overcome this 
standard to avoid preemption. The answer to this question turns on whether Congress 
contemplated a qualitative or quantitative standard. If Congress intended the standard 
be qualitative, it will be determined more akin to a totality of the circumstances 
standard, based on factors as opposed to elements. Conversely, a quantitative standard 
indicates a conjunctive elements test should apply. This test is analogous to a checklist; 
if enough elements can be checked off, the standard is met.  
In both sections, the word “additional” dictates the preemption scope. “Additional” 
is vague and, taken out of context, can be ambiguous. In these sections, “additional” 
acts as an adjective modifying “requirements” and “qualifications requirements.”  
Although “additional” could indicate a qualitative206 standard, its dictionary and 
ordinary meanings are more naturally inclined to a quantitative standard.207 Further, 
at least one federal circuit court has interpreted the ordinary meaning of “additional” 
as “supplemental.”208 A typical preemption analysis would require courts to compare 
PACA and the state statute at issue, and at the outset, determine if the state statute 
contains all of PACA’s core elements.209 If the state statute is missing one or more of 
those core elements, PACA would preempt it, regardless of whether the state statute 
imposes different requirements. For example, Texas’ expert witness qualifications 
statute requires that the expert be a licensed physician, which is the same basic 
requirement as PACA’s first core element.210 However, the Texas statute does not 
require specialty matching—PACA’s second core element.211 Thus, the Texas statute 
could not meet the threshold inquiry and would, therefore, be preempted. 
The Texas statute provides a decent example, but it is by no means a close call; 
PACA would easily preempt it. Michigan’s certificate of merit statute provides a better 
example, especially since PACA’s affidavit of merit section is based off of it. As 
                                                           
205 H.R. 1215, § 13(c) (2017) (emphasis added). 
206 For example, “additional qualifications” could mean a more impressive CV overall 
(qualitative), and “additional certifications” could indicate an increased number of set pre-
requisites for a position (quantitative). 
207 Dictionary definitions of “additional” include “more than is usual or expected”207 
(Additional, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/additional (last visited Feb. 27, 2018)), and “added, extra, or 
supplementary to what is already present or available.”207 Additional, Oxforddictionaries.com, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/additional (last visited Feb. 27, 2018). Further, 
courts have construed the ordinary meaning of “additional” as “supplemental.” Walker Cty. 
School Dist. v. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Town of Burlington v. 
Dep’t of Education, 736 F.2d 773, 790-91 (1st Cir. 1984), aff’d., 471 U.S. 359 (1985)). 
208 Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. For Commonwealth of Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 790 
(1st Cir. 1984). 
209 See Discussion supra at Section III.A.–B. 
210 Compare, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.401(a) (West 2017), and discussion 
supra at Section III.B. 
211 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.401. 
 
54 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 32:1] 
 
previously discussed, PACA adopts 95% of the Michigan statute’s language.212 
Consequently, given the statutory language similarity between the two, Michigan’s 
statute undoubtedly meets the first seven core elements. However, the eighth core 
element is unique to PACA. So despite 95% of Michigan’s statutory language being 
present in PACA, Michigan’s statute cannot meet the threshold analysis necessary to 
avoid preemption. But this leaves open the question of what a state must do to satisfy 
the additional requirements language. More specifically, is representative Cohen’s 
conclusion that state statutes mirroring PACA’s provisions would survive preemption 
correct?  
Luckily, PACA’s expert witness qualifications section, and the Arizona statute the 
drafters borrowed, provide an example. Unlike its affidavit of merit section, PACA’s 
expert witness qualifications section does not add an additional core element to the 
Arizona statute, and these sections match just as closely—95%. More importantly, 
both statutes contain the same four core elements.213 So the threshold question here is 
met. But PACA’s preemption provisions require that the state statutes have additional 
requirements.214 For a state statute like Arizona’s to survive preemption, “additional” 
would have to take on a meaning akin to “greater than or equal to.” Considering the 
dictionary and ordinary meanings of “additional,” attempting to force such a definition 
places a meaning on the word that it simply cannot bear.215 As a result, just like it did 
the Michigan certificate of merit statute, PACA—the Arizona expert witness 
qualifications statute’s progeny—would ultimately prevail. 
As a threshold to avoiding preemption, state statutes must incorporate all of 
PACA’s core requirements. However, because of the presumptions against 
preemption of state law, particularly in areas of traditional state regulatory primacy, 
states can probably satisfy PACA’s individual core elements with similar provisions. 
Medical malpractice is a common law claim in an area of traditional state police 
power—the health and safety of a state’s citizens. As such, the “thumb on the 
interpretive scale” for areas of state police power will likely lead courts to err on the 
side of allowing state provisions, which are in the same general category as a PACA 
provision to counterbalance during a preemption analysis.216 Further, as previously 
established, state certificates of merit and expert witness qualifications vary greatly. 
Since PACA’s preemption provision leaves room for state laws, courts are unlikely to 
require that state provisions be identical to PACA’s. Thus, if a state’s statute 
incorporates a provision analogous to PACAs, that provision should weigh in favor of 
the state statute surviving preemption.217  
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C. Extent to Which State Statutes Will Be Preempted 
With PACA preempting the state statutes it is based on, another question 
emerges—do any state statutes survive? The Arizona and Michigan statutes are again 
helpful, both contain substantially stringent provisions, of which few, if any states can 
match. Thus, PACA very likely preempts every state certificate of merit and expert 
witness qualifications statute currently in effect.  
1. PACA Will Preempt All State Certificates of Merit 
 Michigan’s statute is arguably the strictest state statute enacted to date. Returning 
to the certificate of merit elements identified earlier, Michigan’s statute adopts the 
stricter approach as to every element.218 First, Michigan’s statute adopts the stricter 
approach regarding the expert witness’s role in making the certificate of merit.219 It 
requires that the plaintiff’s expert, rather than her attorney, sign the affidavit.220 Next, 
Michigan’s statute requires that the attorney reasonably believe the expert meets the 
necessary qualifications in Michigan’s heightened expert witness qualifications 
statute.221 Also, Michigan takes one of the, if not the, strictest approaches of any state 
regarding what the expert must attest to in the affidavit.222 Michigan requires that the 
expert attest to (1) the appropriate standard of care, (2) their opinion that that duty was 
breached, (3) what actions the defendant should have taken or omitted to comply with 
the duty, and (4) how the defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
harm.223 While some states also require similar statements, thorough research has not 
revealed any states that go farther. Therefore, since no state goes beyond the 
requirements Michigan imposes, and PACA would preempt Michigan’s certificate of 
merit statute, PACA would also preempt every other state statute, creating a uniform 
federal standard in every jurisdiction. Further, if a state desires to enact a statute that 
would survive PACA in the future, that state would need to formulate a new certificate 
of merit requirement, because PACA incorporates every major provision states 
currently use. 
2. PACA Will Preempt Most Expert Witness Qualifications Statutes 
Like Michigan’s certificate of merit statute, Arizona’s expert witness 
qualifications section also represents one of the strictest state statutes in effect.224 
Arizona’s statute requires that the defendant and expert share, not only the same 
specialty, but any relevant subspecialties, as well as any board certifications.225 In this 
respect, Arizona adopts one of the strictest approaches of any state. However, contrary 
to Michigan’s certificate of merit statute, Arizona takes a laxer approach to some of 
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the other elements. For instance, Arizona requires experts to have been practicing for 
a one-year period prior to the alleged malpractice by the defendant.226 Other states, in 
contrast, require up to six years prior experience leading up to the plaintiff’s injury.227 
More importantly, however, Arizona fails to include one of the major state 
approaches—regional restrictions on experts. Accordingly, PACA also fails to include 
such a provision. So, it is possible that a state could enact a statute similar to PACA 
and Arizona’s statute and include a regional restriction on expert witnesses. As of yet, 
however, the states that do impose regional restrictions do not appear to meet PACA’s 
preemption threshold inquiry of first sharing all of the core elements.228  
3. PACA’s Negative Effects 
In addition to federalism concerns, PACA’s vague preemption provisions raise 
several negative practical implications.229 First, mandating a uniform tort-reform 
standard is not sound policy. Commentators have studied and dissected state tort 
reform measures for decades. But, in spite if this, commentators disagree, first and 
foremost, that the litigation crises are even real.230 Among those that believe in the 
crises, there is no agreement that tort-reform is effective in remedying the problem.231 
And of those commentators that (a) believe the problem exists and (b) agree tort 
reform may fix it, there is still no consensus on what measures are optimal.232 There 
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Tennessee does not require strict specialty matching, it only requires that the expert be in a 
specialty that would make her testimony relevant to the issues in the case). 
229 See Madden, supra note 3, at 64 & n.95.  
230 See Beth Rogers, Legal Reform—At the Expense of Federalism?, 21 U. Dayton L. R. 513, 
523 (1996) (“Federal [tort] reform is unnecessary because there is no ‘litigation explosion’ 
and because states already have begun to reform these areas of the law.”); Johnston, supra 
note 8, at 184-85 (“A substantial and accumulating body of evidence lends support to the 
existence of a litigation explosion. While the evidence does not conclusively establish its 
existence, or define its parameters and implications, the litigation explosion has become a 
topic at the forefront of current political, legal, and social debate. It has already “engaged the 
attention of all three branches of the federal government as well as many state legislatures.” 
Further, “an avalanche of literature, both professional and popular, has addressed the problem 
and advanced numerous overlapping solutions.” Accumulating evidence and commentary 
supports the notion that a litigation explosion is occurring within the United States judicial 
system even if questions as to the cause and desirability of the explosion remain 
unexplained.”); Penrose, supra note 48, at 978-79 (“Today, doctors and lawyers are battling 
inside and outside of the courtroom to resolve a perceived medical malpractice crisis. There is 
strong and unyielding rhetoric on both sides. . . . Yet the empirical research guiding those 
reforms has not produced consistent results.”) 
231 Parness, supra note 51, at 545 (“Opponents also deemed legislation unnecessary because 
there was no evidence presented showing how the civil justice system negatively affected job 
creation, job retention, or insurance costs…”). 
232 See Williams, supra note 38, at 514–21 (proposing a comprehensive tort reform package 
that cherry picks certain reform measures); Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1079 (“despite the best 
intentions of the various and numerous legislatures that passed them, screening and arbitration 
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is likewise no conclusive evidence that the measures PACA adopts are preferable to 
the other approaches some states take. As such, allowing states to establish unique 
standards provides data that can then be evaluated to determine what approaches are 
superior. However, setting a uniform standard eliminates these useful comparators. 
Thus, until a clearly preferable approach is identified, Congress should not adopt a 
uniform standard for uniformity’s sake.  
Furthermore, by not explicitly stating its intent to preempt all state laws, PACA 
necessitates a state-by-state preemption analysis. Because no federal cause of action 
for medical malpractice exists, this analysis will occur primarily in state courts, which 
are less qualified than federal courts to determine preemption.233 Thus, if PACA is 
enacted, state courts in the twenty-seven states with certificate of merit statutes in 
effect will have to decide whether PACA preempts that state’s statute. Given PACA’s 
preemption language ambiguity and the drafter’s veiled intent, these state trial and 
appellate courts will likely reach different interpretations, and it is almost certain that 
courts of different states that must interpret PACA’s provisions in relation to vastly 
different state statutes will come to different conclusions. PACA’s vagueness will 
create disparate applications across state and local jurisdictions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
“To do nothing is sometimes a good remedy” 
—Hippocrates 
 
Extreme diseases often require extreme remedies (cancer is treated with 
chemotherapy and radiation; doctors will cut off a hand to save an arm). But these 
extreme remedies are only appropriate after the ailment has been diagnosed. As it 
stands, the most appropriate remedy for this extreme disease is simple—Congress 
should do nothing. Before administering a remedy, the disease must be diagnosed. 
Despite decades of examination, the maladies infecting the healthcare system remain 
a mystery. Right now, each state represents a laboratory for innovation and 
experimentation, fifty experimental trials seeking an effective remedy to an extreme 
disease. Unless and until one of these remedies proves effective, Congress should do 
nothing. Luckily, in today’s political climate, doing nothing is what Congress does 
best, so the healthcare system might get exactly the medicine it needs. 
 
                                                           
panels actually increase litigation costs and considerably reduce insurer profitability. In 
addition, although capping of damages does not result in any additional economic harm to the 
insurer, it has had minimal positive impact at best and has exacted enormous social costs. The 
certificate of merit requirement, on the other hand, has proven effective in reducing insurers' 
litigation costs without significant social costs. However, because many jurisdictions employ 
the certificate of merit requirement along with other, less effective, and more damaging means 
of litigation reform, the benefits of the certificate of merit reform are often cancelled out by 
the deleterious effects of the more harmful reform approaches.”). 
233 See Bauer, supra note 192, at 9. 
